This paper studies sales promotion through coupons in an oligopolistic market.
General Foods succeeded in defending its market, but at a high cost.
With couponing the manuCacturer has at least partial control of the type of household reached. T'hus he is able to offer a reduced price to a specific segment of the market.
Coupons can serve as a price discrimination device. Only those consumers who have received a coupon are able to benefit from the rebate. Since this enables the manufacturer to separate market segments, coupons are more than just a low price offered to all consumers. An alternative explanation of coupons has been proposed by Cremer (1984) and Caminal and Matutes (1990) . In these models, coupons create a lock-in effect.
because the consumer is o(fered a rebate on future purchases of the product. The seller can stabilize his market share by creating ari artificial cost of switching suppliers. This is in direct contrast with our model, where coupons tend to make switching more attrac-
tive. Yet another explanation (Gerstner and Hess (1991) ) is that the seller can motivate retailer participation in the sales promotion by offering rebates to the consumers.
The literature on the price discrimination aspects of coupons is rather scarce. Narasimhan (1984) studies the consumers' decision to use a coupon. Only consumers with a sufficiently low opportunity cost of time take advantage oí coupons. Thus price discrimination can be achieved through self-selection. Caminal and Matutes (1990) is, to our knowledge, the only study of oligopolistic behaviour, but in a repeat purchase context.. In t.heir model Lhe consurner receives a rebate only after purchasing a second unit from the same seller. The role of coupons is to create a switching cost in the second period. If the firms precommit to a discount, competition in that period is decreased and the equilibrium profits inrrcasc.
In contrast, in our model coupons increase competition between firrns. Each individual seller has an incentive to reduce the brand loyalty of the other firms' clientele in order to increase his market share. But, offering a rebate amounts to reducing the consumers' switching cost and so competition is intensified. In equilibrium, each seller's profits are lower than if coupons or price discrimination were not allowed. Price discrimination in combination with oligopolistic competition leads to lower prices; the consumers as a whole are better off when the sellers compete by using coupons.
The finding that firm profits may be lower as a result of price discrimination is similar to the findings of Thisse and Vives (1988) . They show that discrimination is a dominant strategy for each firm. Yet, it leads to lower profits than a uniform price. Levy and Gerlowski (1991) show that "meeting competition clausesn, whereby a seller announces to meet the competitor's price, may reduce equilibrium profits. One may view such clauses as a special type of coupon; they allow the seller to discriminate between those consumers who only receive his own ad and those who receive ads also from other firms.
In our model the manufacturers use coupons as long as the marginal cost of distributing coupons are iiot too hígh. Under certain assumptions on distribution costs, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium. In this equilibrium, as couponing becomes more expensive, the firms' profits increase, while consumer welfare decreases. This is so because a higher cost of price discrimination reduces competition between the firms. The sellers' profits increase and consumer welfare decreases also when the consumers become more heterogeneous. The intuition is that a higher degree of brand loyalty reduces the firms' incentive to use coupons as a discrimination device, which in turn leads to higher average prices for the consumers.
The following Section presents a simplified example, where we abstract from the costs of issuing coupons and from differences in the consumers' degree of brand loyalty.
Section 3 describes the general model. We study the equilibrium marketing behaviour of the firms in Section 4. Section 5 provides some comparative statics and welfare tesults.
All proofs are relegated to an Appendix. 2 An Example T'o illustrate the main features of our analysis, we first present a simplified example of the more general model studied in the following sections. We study a duopoly market characterized by some segmentation according to location, brand loyalty, or access to product information. Using the language of the locational application, the model considers the following situation: There are two sellers, A and B, located in different neighbourhoods of some geographical market. The sellers' production costs are normalized to zero. In each localit.y, there is a unit mass of consumers with a totally inelastic demand for one unit of the good for all prices between zero and v 1 0. When a consumer purchases the good from the seller in the distant location, he has to pay a transportation cost s c v. Shilony (1977) studies the equilibrium of this market when the sellers compete by setting prices in a standard Bertrand fashion. If v C 2s, both sellers will post the price p" -v in equilibrium. Undercutting the competitor's price is not profitable since this would yield a profit of at most 2(v -s) G v. The price setting game between the duopolists fails to have a pure strategy equilibrium if v 7 2s. Indeed, any combination of prices (pA, pB ) would allow one of the two sellers to gain either by undercutting the other seller or by increasing his price by some small amount. Shilony (1977) shows that that there is a unique symmetric mixed strategy solution where each seller gains an expected profit higher than s.
Ve now introduce oligopolistic price discrimination. Even though the seller is unable Lo identify thc origin of the customers at his store, he can separate t,hem through coupons. 't:ach seller is able to offer the good at different prices in the two regions by mailing coupons to the other region. Coupons enta:l a legally binding promise by the seller to offer a rebate upon presentation. In our example, we abstract from mailing costs and assume that seller i can costlessly send coupons to all consumers in region j.
The coupon entitles its owner to buy the good from seller i at the price p; -r;, while buyers without a coupon have to pay p;.
In this sirnple example, competition betwc~en the duopolists, A and f3, results in the following equilibrium outcome:
PA-Pa-P~-s~ra-ra-r'-s.
(1) The example demonstrates that price discrimination increases competition. The consumers have to pay lower prices and the firms' profits are reduced. Indeed, each seller carns a prufiL of .v, which is luwcr Lhan Lhc proÍil. hc, gcts in thc abscncc of discrirninatory pricing. In thc following, we will verify this observation in a rnore geueral model.
In fact, the above example has some unappealing features because the consumers' purchasing decisions have to be based on a tie-breaking rule. Even though the equilibrium requires both sellers to use coupons, this marketing instrument is actually ineffective since no consumer is induced to switch. If the sellers had to pay a mailing cost, the above equilibrium would therefore collapse. The subsequent model will overcome these difficulties by introducing some consumer heterogeneity. with each other so that trading coupons is not possible.
The marketing strategy of firm i may be described by x; -(p;, r;,~;) . The cost function k(.) is assumed to satisfy the following restrictions:
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The marginal cost of couponing is increasing in the number of households reached.
This assumption is standard in the advertising literature ( see Butters ( 1977) and Grossman and Shapiro ( 1989)). The underlying idea is that thP manufacturer can distributrc oupons via mail and by placing ads in a set of magazines or newspapers. The probability that a given consumer receives a coupon through one of these media is independent of receiving a coupon through the other media. In this case, the cost of making sure that a fraction a of consumers receives at least one coupon becomes a convex function oí a. The additional assumptions on k'(.) guarantee that each manufacturer will choose some advertising intensity 0 C 1; G I. In addition, we restrict the analysis to the case v~s. This ensures that competition is sufficiently strong so that setting p; -v cannot be optimal for seller i.
Equilibrium
We assume that each consumer is aware of the availability of the good in both regions. In addition he knows Lhe price charged by each of the sellers. In this situation, advertising conveys no information about the existence or the price of a good. Distributing coupons only serves to price discriminate between buyers from different regions. By offering a rebate the seller increases the attractiveness of his product for those consumers who have to spend the cost s in order to visit his store.
To compute each seller's demand, one has to distinguish four groups of consumers:
ln eacli of the two mgions thc~purchasing decision of thc consurners who have received a coupon diffen from those without a coupon. A consumer at locatiou A who has not received a coupon frorn firm B purchases the good at his home location as long as pA C pB -~s. If, however, he gets a coupon of value r~, he will buy from seller A only if pq C pB -rg f s. When consumer s at location B is not offered a rebate, he will be attracted by firm A's price offer if pA f s C pB. Otherwise, with a coupon rA, he will purchase from firm A if pA -rA~-s C pB.
Given the consumers' demand decisions, firm A's profit HA(xA, xB) depends on both firms' sales strategies and is given by Our first result provides a characterizationof the symmetric pure strategy equilibrium.
Proposition 1: Let (xA, x~) 6e an equiliórium such that xA -xR -(P, r", a'). Then (p',r',a') is given by the unique solution to With the help of Figure 1 we can easily establish some comparative statics propertie~s of the equilibrium outcome (li ,r',a'). For instanee, an increase iu Lhe rnarginal cost.
k'(.) leads to a higher equilibrium price p' and a lower level of advertising a' because the K-K schedule is shifted upwards. How does the equilibrium react to a change in the consumers' transportation cost? Increasing the parameter s is equivalent to increasing each consumer's switching cost by the same íactor. In Figure 1 this leads to an upward shift of the P-P schedule. Conse.quently, both p' and~' are increased.
Not all consumers who are couponed will makc~use of the rebate. 1{irdeeming Lhc coupon is worthwhile only when s C r' -p' -r'. Accordiugly, the redernption rate is (p' -r')~s -1~(2 t a'). That is, more than one half of the coupons is not returned to the manufacturer. Using the above comparative statics results, it follows that the equilibrium redemption rate is increasing in the marginal cost of couponing. A cost increase reduces the number of households that are couponed, but the fraction of households that redeem the coupon is increased. An increase in the consumers' transportation cost has the opposite effect: More households are couponed, but a lower fraction returns the coupon. Note, however, that the total number of coupons actually redeemed is given by a`~(2f~'), which is increasing in a'. This number is, therefore, negatively related to the niargiual cozl. of coupuning anii posit.ivcly relal.cd lo Lhc Icvcl of cousuini~r swilching cost.s.
Of course, the result that the coupon oífers a 50"~u price rebate is specific to the setting of our model. In particular, the uniform distribution of switching costs is important in this context. One can show that the sellers would optimally offer a lower rebate if the distribution of s puts more weight on low switching costs. The intuition is that attracting high cost consumers through a rebate is not profitable when these consumers represent only a small fraction of the total population. 
The equilibrium characterization by Proposition 1 is derived from the first order conditions that the profit maximizing marketing strategies xA and xB necessarily have to satisfy. Unfortunately, the first order conditions are not sufficient for profit maximiza-
tion. The reason is that the firms' profit functions are not jointly concave in (p;, r;,~; ).
Because of this non-concavity, one has to be careful that no seller can increase his profit.
by, for instance, simultaneously lowering his price and his advertising intensity. The following assumption guarantees that such deviations from (p', r', a') are not profitable. This assumption requires the cost function k(.) to be suíficiently convex, which allows us to establish existence of a pure strategy equilibrium.
Proposition 2: Let k(.) satàsjy Assumption 1. Then, there às an equiliórium (xA,xB) S7lftt til(ti TA -TH -(p ,r',.~').
Within the family of cost functions k(a) -cad, Assumption I is satisfied as long as a~3. Therefore, the above example satisfies this assumption and the solution described by equation (5) constitutes an equilibrium outcome. Assumption 1 guarantees that the seller's optimal advertising int,ensity is not very sensitive to price changes. In general, the optimal distribution rate .~; is positively related to seller i's price p;. Under Assumption 1, however, a given reduction in p; has only a small impact on the optimal~;. This ensures that seller i cannot gain from setting p; c p' together with a; c a'.
Even though the manufacturer's profit function is not jointly concave in (p;, r, a, ),
it. is continuous. This implies Lhat there is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium when Assumption 1 is not satisfied (sa~llasgupta and Maskin (1986) ). In such au eyuilibriurn the sellers choose a random marketing policy. Since for a given a" seller i's profit is concave in (p;,r;), it follows from the first order conditions that the optimal p; is positively related with a,. Similarly, the optimal r; increases with p;. ln the mixed strategy equilibrium, therefore, each seller chooses a; stochastically and he combines higher values of a; with higher prices p; and higher coupon values r;.
5 Welfare ln this section we investigate how the market participants' welfare depends on the advertising cost k(.) and the transportation cost parameter s. As a measure of consumer welfare, wc, consider aggregate consumer surplus, C, which depends on (p',r', a') according to
~s ds. (6) lo,a]
The first term represents the utility of the consumers who do not receive a coupon. The other consumers' purchasing decision depends on the rebate r' and the switching cost s. Consumer s will make use of the coupon only if v-p'~v-p'~r' -s. Finally, we define social welfare as the sum of producer profits and consumer surplus. We begin by studying the relation between welfare and s. Not surprisingly, producer profits are positively related to the level of brand loyalty or geographical differentiation. When the sellers are able to choose products, they will seek to maximize the degree of market segmentation. The principle of`maximal differentiation', as described by D 'Aspremont et al. (1979) , remains valid when couponing is introduced. An increase in s has a two-fold impact on consumer surplus: First, the consumer has to pay higher prices. Second, he ís more likely to receive a coupon. The above result demonstrates that the first negative efiect outweighs the second positive effect. Indeed, as was shown before, the coupon redemption rate decreases with s. Finally, social welfare is negatively related to s: The higher s, the higher is the coupon distribution intensity, a', and the number of coupons actually redeemed, a'~(2 f a').
This means that the resources spend on couponing and the consumers' aggregate travel costs increase with s.
To study the impact of the advertising cost on equilibrium payoffs, we consider cost functions of the type k(a) -cao-. An increase in the parameter c then shifts the cost function upwards so that also the marginal cost of advertising is increased.
Proposition 4: Let k(a) -cav, with o 1 3. Then equilibrium profits and social surplus are increasing in c. Consumer surplus is decreasing in c.
Surprisingly, an increase in the cost of couponing makes the sellers better off. Of course, seller i gains by a reduction in c when the rnarketing strategy x~of his opponent is kept fixed. In addition to this direct effect, however, there is an indirect effect. Lower advertising costs make competition more aggressive. This reduces the sellers' prices and their equilibrium profits. A similar observation has been made in models of informative advertising (see Bester and Petrakis (1992) , and Peters (1984) ), where a tax on advertising may increase profits. Since higher couponing costs increase prices and reduce coupon distribution, the consumers become worse off. Aggregate welfare, however, is increased.
'1'h~~intuiliun is t.hal. Ih~~s~,lh~i:v wasle-h~ss resuuni~s un~unpuning cuusutni~rs and Lhr consurners save on switching costs.
Conclusions
Thís paper has studied couponing as a price discrimination device in oligopolistic competition. By couponing those consumers who have some preference for a competing brand, a seller can increase his market share. Coupons may compensate the consumer 13 for a costly movement to another brand. In contrast with the repeat-purchasc explanation, coupons reduce consumer switching costs in our model. The price discrimination model predicts that couponing intensifies competition between the sellers, leading to lower prices and profits.
Our simple model may be extended in several interesting directions. We assumed that all the consumers have the same valuation for the good. As a result, total demand was fixed. Introducing some dispersion of consumer valuations would make aggregate demand elastic. As couponing increases competition, it would raise aggregate output.
Couponing may have a positive effect on social welfare if the elasticity of demand is sufficiently high. Also, the value of the coupon relative to the príce of the product would presumably depend on the distribution of consumer valuations.
Removing the symmet,ric st,ructure of the modcl would be another interest,ing extension. In our n odel, the sellers were identical and so they used the same marketing strategy. This wc;uld no longer be the case when different production technologies are considered. An e:ctension along these lines could provide insights into the relation between a firm's efficiency and its marketing policy. Similarly, one could study the role of a firm's size whet~the number of consumers differs across market segments. One might expect that smaller firms have a higher incentive to distribute coupons because they can gain more by attracting consumers from other market segments. 
This impli~s í3ll ale3pn -I~' -2pn f P(1 -0.5~'))Js. If p' G s~(1 t O.~ia'), then for pA close enough to p' one gets r3fl A~ópA~0 so that firm A could gain by charging a price slightly abovc p'. As a result, onc must havc p' ? s~(1 f 0.5a').
Finally, we show that firm A cannot gain by setting pA C p' only if p' C s~(1 f0.5a').
The profit from choosing pA E(p' -r', p') together with aA -a' and pA -rA -0.5p' equals nA -PA(l -a')~[PA~~(s -PA f 0.5p') f pA(I -~')(P -PA)]~~5 (g) fa`(P~2)2~s -k(a').
Therefore, anA~apA -[s -2pA f p'(1 -0.5a')]~s. If p' ) s~(1 -~0.5a'), then for pA close enough to p' one gets allA~apA G 0 so that firm A could gain by charging a price slightly below p'. As a result, one must have p' c s~(1 f 0.5a').
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Let firm B use the strategy aB -(p', r', a`) such that p', r', and a' satisfy the conditions of Proposition 1. We will show that adopting the same strategy is a best response for firrn A.
First we show that choosing some pA 1 p' is not profitable for firm A. By lemma 2, firm A will optimally set pA -rA -0.5p'. Therefore, the profit frorn choosing pA E (p',p`f s) together with some aA equals
From the first order condition it follows that firm A will optimally set aA -a'. This
where the in~yuality follows from pA~p' -s~(I f 0.5a') Thus, firm A cannot gain by adopting sorne strategy xA~(li ,r',~') such thai. pq~p'.
'1'o complcte thc argumcul., wc show that choosi~ig somc pA C)i is not pro(itabl~f or firm A. As firm A will optimally set pA -rA -0.5p`, its profit írom choosing pA E(p' -r', p') together with some aA equals nA -PA(I -a') f [pAa'(s -pA -6 0.5p') f pA(I -aA)(P -PA)]~s (11)
For any pA c p' the optima] choice of aA has to satisfy the first order condition pA(p' -
, so that aA G a' by convexity of k(.) This equation can be rewritten as
Note that p'2 -9s(k'(a') -k'(aA)] -4sk'(aA) and that, by lemma 1, pA~0.5n . Therefore, the above equation yields the solution
Since aA c a', A~sumption 1 implies 8IIA~8pA~0. Thus firm A cannot gain by adopting some strategy xA~(p',r',a') such that pA G p'. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: Equilibrium profits are given by
By convexity of k(.}, II; is increasing in a'. As a result, s and II; are positively related bccause a' is an incrcasing (rmct,ion o( s.
Consumc~r surplus cquals
C -2v -2p' f a'p'2~4s -2v -8k'(a')(1 t 0.5a') f a'k'(a'j (I6) -2v -8k'(a') -3a'k'(a')
As an increase in s raises a', this proves that consumer surplus is decreasing in d.
Social welfare equals W-2II; f C-2v -2k(a') -a'k'(a"). An increase in s leads to a higher value of a' so that the social welfare is reduced. Q.E.D. 
